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“It’s the Same Old Song”: The Failure 
of the Originality Requirement in 
Musical Copyright 
Valeria M. Castanaro* 
Have you ever flipped through the radio stations and felt like 
you’re hearing the same song over and over again?  Better yet, 
have you ever paused on one station thinking that one song was 
playing, but in fact a different song was being broadcast that 
sounded dubiously similar to the song you initially perceived?  
Billie Holiday once said: “If you copy, it means you’re working 
without any real feeling.  No two people on Earth are alike, and it’s 
got to be that way in music or it isn’t music.”1  If Billie Holiday 
was listening to the radio today, she wouldn’t know what to call 
the sound waves taking over the airwaves because to her, the 
barrage of copycat artists and dubiously similar songs simply 
would not be music.  As a teenager, I was constantly subjected to 
my mother’s opinion that all of the music I listened to either 
sounded the same or was a rip-off of a song from her generation.  
As an adult reflecting on the music of my generation, I’m inclined 
to agree with her and have begun to wonder where the originality 
in music has gone—and how can we get it back?2 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2820.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
 1 Billie Holiday, BrainyQuote, http://www.brainyquote.com/quotes/authors/b/billie_ 
holiday.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2007). 
 2 Alex Tyson, Musicians Lose Artistic Integrity, UNIVERSITY WIRE, May 26, 2006 
(commenting on the lack of the originality in “new” music and hypothesizing as to why 
the art of copying music sells records). 
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Apparently, this is not an original question.  In light of the 
recent copyright scandal centered on Avril Lavigne’s 2007 summer 
hit, Girlfriend, many voices in popular culture have begun to 
question the originality requirement of musical works.3  A 1970s 
musical group, The Rubinoos, brought suit for copyright 
infringement against Ms. Lavigne on May 25, 2007, claiming that 
her hit, Girlfriend, is an infringement upon their 1979 song, I 
Wanna Be Your Boyfriend.4  Since the start of this controversy, it 
has also been said that Girlfriend sounds dubiously similar to Tony 
Basil’s Mickey.5  One newspaper writer, commenting on the 
frequency of the practice of copyright infringement in the musical 
world, said: “Granted, I’m no lawyer.  But if I were Avril, I might 
go with the ‘everyone else is doing it’ defense.”6 
The existence of two songs sounding remarkably similar is not 
a new occurrence.  We live in a musical era marked by covers, 
music sampling, and dubiously similar songs that are the product 
of both accidental and conscious borrowing.7  When The Rubinoos 
released I Wanna Be Your Boyfriend, it was widely recognized 
among record reviewers and fans alike that the chorus melody bore 
a remarkable resemblance to that of the Rolling Stones’ song Get 
Off Of My Cloud.8  Other examples of songs that are suspiciously 
similar to those that came before them include Vanilla Ice’s Ice Ice 
Baby (compared with David Bowie and Queen’s Under Pressure),9 
2 Live Crew’s Pretty Woman (compared with Roy Orbison’s song 
by the same name),10 the Red Hot Chili Peppers’ Dani California 
 
 3 See infra Part III. 
 4 Girlfriend (Avril Lavigne Song), Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Girlfriend_ 
(Avril_Lavigne_song) (last visited Mar. 10, 2008). 
 5 Ernest Jasmin, Hey, Your Influences are Showing, THE NEWS TRIBUNE (Tacoma, 
Wash.), July 20, 2007. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. (“[O]bviously a lot of today’s songs sound dubiously like yesterday’s songs.”). 
 8 Ann Powers, Critic’s Notebook: Originality?  Since When was that a Requirement?, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007, at F01. 
 9 See Brian G. Bourke, Ice Hot?  Robert Van Winkle: Is He a For Real Act or Has He 
Got Us All Snowed?, THE POST-STANDARD (Syracuse, NY), Mar. 7, 1991, at HJ. 
 10 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1993). 
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(compared with Tom Petty’s Mary Jane’s Last Dance),11 and 
Michael Bolton’s Love is a Wonderful Thing (compared with the 
Isley Brothers song by the same name).12  I’m sure you can think 
of a plethora of songs that fit into this category.  So the question 
remains: how can creativity and originality in the music industry 
work together with accountability to simultaneously protect the 
rights of original copyright holders and prevent stifling the creative 
process? 
Angry pop-rock princess Avril is not the first of her peers to be 
the subject of copyright infringement allegations.  These suits, 
brought by original artists against new artists who produce songs 
that sound remarkably like the original, are usually, but not always, 
settled out of court.  In the case of the above mentioned Michael 
Bolton song, the original artists, the Isley Brothers, were awarded 
$5.4 million in damages in 1994.13  Similarly, Vanilla Ice was 
forced to share the royalties from Ice Ice Baby with David Bowie 
and Queen, the original artists of Under Pressure, for use of a 
seemingly similar bass line.14  Further terms of the settlement also 
required that Vanilla Ice retroactively give David Bowie and the 
members of Queen songwriting credit.15  George Harrison was not 
fortunate enough to settle his suit with the Chiffons out of court.  
In Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., the district 
court found Harrison guilty of subconscious copyright 
infringement,16 and he consequently paid damages in excess of 
$500,000.17 
 
 11 See David Schmeichel, Rename that Tune?; Creedence Clearwater Revival’s John 
Fogerty is Not the Only Rocker Who’s Been Accused of Rewriting History, WINNIPEG 
SUN, July 26, 2007, at 38. 
 12 How They Measure Up, LONDON FREE PRESS (Ontario), July 15, 2007, at E12. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Bourke, supra note 9. 
 15 See Ice Ice Baby, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ice_Ice_Baby (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2008); see, e.g., Ice Ice Baby, BMI Repertoire, http://repertoire.bmi.com (search 
for title “Ice Ice Baby”) (listing David Bowie, the members of Queen, and Robert Van 
Winkle (“Vanilla Ice”) as songwriters). 
 16 See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that copyright infringement exists under the law even if it is 
accomplished subconsciously). 
 17 See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 798, 801 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
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In light of these examples of similar songs, settlements, and 
actual litigation, it is clear that actual originality in music is on its 
way out, and technological advancements and the Internet seem to 
be the reason why.  In response to the Internet’s effect on pop 
music, Elton John “suggested that a five-year cyberspace shutdown 
might be the only way to renew the music’s creativity.”18  
Although it is true that the history of making music is deeply 
embedded in borrowing and sampling,19 artists still like to think of 
their expression as original and unique.20  Unfortunately, the public 
does not think a musical work that sounds dubiously similar to a 
previous work is original or unique, despite the artist’s intention.  
The listening public deserves more in the way of creativity.21 
This Note examines traditional copyright infringement, such as 
the alleged borrowing that is the subject of controversy in the Avril 
Lavigne situation, in light of new and advanced technology and 
media.  Part I provides a legal background of copyright, detailing 
the purpose and rationale of the Copyright Act, the rights of a 
copyright holder, the interpretation of the originality requirement, 
and the elements of copyright infringement.  Part II presents the 
conflict resulting from the inability of the current musical 
copyright regime to address the epidemic of traditional copyright 
infringement made easier by the Internet.  Part III proposes that 
one way to address the inadequacy of the current musical copyright 
schema is to raise the bar for the originality requirement in musical 
copyright and to use the new level of access provided by the 
Internet to increase artists’ awareness of, and accountability to, the 
existing catalogue. 
 
 18 Powers, supra note 8. 
 19 Jasmin, supra note 5 (discussing the history of musical borrowing). 
 20 Powers, supra note 8 (“Artists like to believe their self-expression is really theirs; 
perhaps even more importantly, the financial structure of the music industry, which 
rewards creativity when it’s copyrighted, has upheld the idea that one person can ‘own’ a 
song.”). 
 21 See id. (“To music fans who still believe that heroic individualism is the essence of 
great music . . . they are the ones pop is leaving behind.  Originality is dead.  Long may 
creativity flower as it rises from the earth of a million songs . . . that have come before.”). 
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I. COPYRIGHT LAW 
A major public policy concern has always been balancing the 
interests of promoting creativity in the arts and protecting the 
creator of the artistic expression.22  Congress passed the Copyright 
Act of 1976, codified in Title 17 of the United States Code, as an 
extension of its power as provided for in the United States 
Constitution.23  Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution 
states the following: “[t]he Congress shall have the power to 
promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for 
limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries.”24  Congress exercised this 
power through different versions of the Act, the most recent being 
the Copyright Act of 1976.25  The goal of the Copyright Act is to 
protect original works of authorship, while still promoting the 
creation of new works.26  Copyright law promotes creativity by 
protecting original works from being copied in their use and 
enjoyment by the general public.  This simultaneously creates 
incentives for authors by ensuring that credit is given where credit 
is due.  At the same time, the protection of these works cannot be 
to such an extent as to stifle the creation of new works by new 
artists.27 
Works that are entitled to copyright protection are defined in § 
102 of the Copyright Act.28  According to the statute, “musical 
works, including any accompanying words,” as well as “sound 
 
 22 See History of Copyright Law, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_ 
copyright_law (last visited Mar. 9, 2008). 
 23 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 25 The Copyright Act of 1976 is the governing body of law for determining whether or 
not a work is entitled to copyright protection, and if so, what constitutes infringement of 
the copyrighted work. See Randy S. Kravis, Does a Song by any Other Name Still Sound 
as Sweet?: Digital Sampling and its Copyright Implications, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 231, 239–
40 (1993). 
 26 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 656 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(“The copyright laws attempt to strike a balance between protecting original works and 
stifling further creativity.”). 
 27 See, e.g., Meade v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 367, 371–72 (1992) (quoting Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429–30 (1984) (describing 
how Congress must balance the protection of work with the free flow of ideas)). 
 28 17 U.S.C. § 102 (a)(2), (7). 
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recordings,” are copyrightable expressions.29  The artist who holds 
the copyright to an original work is entitled to exclusive rights in 
the work as provided in § 106 of the Act.30  Section 106 provides 
the author of a musical work with the exclusive rights to reproduce 
or sell the copyrighted work, prepare derivative works, perform or 
display the work, and to perform the work publicly through the use 
of digital audio transmission.31  Copyright infringement occurs 
when someone interferes with any of the exclusive rights of a 
copyright holder.32  To avoid infringement, the individual seeking 
to use the copyrighted work must seek the permission of the 
copyright holder.33  The exclusive rights of § 106 are subject to 
limitations, such as the fair use exception34 and certain 
performances, as provided in §§ 107 through 122.35 
A central component of copyright law is the doctrine of the 
idea-expression dichotomy.  The idea-expression dichotomy 
acknowledges that there are two components to any copyrighted 
work: the ideas behind the work and the actual expression of those 
ideas that becomes the work.  It is a generally accepted principle of 
copyright law that copyright protection does not extend to “any 
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery.”36  In determining what aspects of a work 
are entitled to copyright protection, the court must separate the 
elements of original expression in a work from the basic ideas 
embodied in the work.37  Only the elements comprising original 
 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id. § 106. 
 31 See id.  A derivative work is a musical work that includes significant portions of 
copyrighted material of an original, previously created work. See id. § 101. 
 32 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 796 (8th ed. 2004). 
 33 See Joseph K. Christian, Too Much of a Good Thing?  Deciphering Copyright 
Infringement for the Musician, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 132, 133 (2004) (interpreting 
the meaning of the exclusive rights in a copyrighted work to a copyright holder in music). 
 34 Fair use entitles others to use a copyrighted work for certain purposes, such as 
educational use.  The court examines four factors when deciding whether or not a 
potential infringement constitutes fair use: (1) purpose and character of the use; (2) nature 
of the copyrighted work; (3) amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the work as a whole; and (4) effect of the use on the potential market or value of the 
copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 35 See id. § 106; see also id. §§ 107–22. 
 36 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 37 See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993). 
CASTANARO_050508_FINAL 5/5/2008  12:32:36 PM 
2008] ORIGINALITY IN MUSICAL COPYRIGHT  1277 
expression receive copyright protection.38  The concept behind the 
idea-expression dichotomy is related to the basic maxim of 
copyright law, which seeks to balance rewarding the author and 
allowing for the creation of new works.39  Therefore, the exclusive 
rights of the copyright holder only extend to the protected 
elements. 
Another fundamental aspect of copyright is that copyright 
protection may only be afforded to “original works of 
authorship.”40  Throughout the history of copyright law, courts 
have declined to define the meaning of originality in this context.41  
The legislative history of § 102 explains that the phrase “original 
works of authorship” was purposely left undefined in order to 
allow the courts to develop the concept.42  Originality is not meant 
to include “requirements of novelty, ingenuity, or esthetic merit.”43  
Only a minimal amount of originality is required for a work to 
qualify for protection.44  The work simply needs to be original to 
the author and include a modicum of creative thought.45  In the 
context of musical works, originality needs to be found in the 
song’s rhythm, harmony, or melody.46  Originality is most often 
found in melody, however, a “musical theme” that is suggestive of 
a previous work may still be considered original if the “overall 
impression is of a new work.”47  Despite this low threshold, the 
 
 38 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 39 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 656 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 40 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 41 See 1-2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01 
(2007) (noting that there is no definition of originality in the statute and that the 1909 Act 
did not define or explicitly require originality) [hereinafter NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT]. 
 42 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
uscode/html/uscode17/usc_sec_17_00000102----000-notes.html. 
 43 Id. 
 44 ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 377 (4th ed. 2006) (citing Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. 
Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102–03 (2d Cir. 1951)); see also Emanation Inc. v. 
Zomba Recording Inc., 72 F.App’x 187, 190 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 45 MERGES ET AL., supra note 44, at 377 (“As developed by the courts, originality 
entails independent creation of a work featuring a modicum of creativity.  Independent 
creation requires only that the author not have copied the work from some other 
source.”). 
 46 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 41, § 2.05(D). 
 47 Id. 
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court has acknowledged that originality is an indispensable part of 
copyright.48 
Violation of the exclusive rights to an original work of 
authorship constitutes copyright infringement, and § 501 of the 
Copyright Act governs infringing activity.49  To prevail on a claim 
of infringement, the party asserting infringement must possess a 
valid copyright in the original work and must show that the 
defendant copied protected elements of the original work.50  
Ownership of a valid copyright is easily proven through a 
certification of copyright, which is issued to the holder by the 
Copyright Office.51  After establishing ownership in a valid 
copyright, the holder must show that the accused infringed upon 
the holder’s exclusive rights, either through direct or indirect 
evidence of copying.52  If a presumption of infringement is shown, 
the defendant bears the burden of overcoming the presumption.53 
The difficult element of copyright litigation lies within proving 
that the defendant actually copied the original work.  To prove that 
actual copying has occurred, the copyright holder must show 
through direct or indirect evidence that the defendant had access to 
the copyrighted work and that there are probative similarities 
between the two works.54  Direct copying occurs when the new 
work borrows verbatim from the original.55  Factual copying is 
shown through evidence that the defendant had access to the 
original work before creating the infringing work, and probative 
similarities between the works.56  In situations where the original 
and infringed work are “so strikingly similar” that the similarities 
 
 48 See Feist Publ’ns. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating that although 
minimal, the requirement of originality is a necessary aspect of a copyrightable work). 
 49 See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2000). 
 50 See, e.g., Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 831 (10th Cir. 
1993). 
 51 See id. 
 52 See id. at 832. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. at 832–33. 
 55 Emanation Inc. v. Zomba Recording Inc., 72 F.App’x. 187, 189 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 56 Id. 
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cannot reasonably be attributed to coincidence, the court can draw 
an inference of copying without evidence of access.57 
Proving that the defendant had access to the original work is an 
issue in and of itself.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines access in the 
copyright context as: “an opportunity by one accused of 
infringement to see, hear, or copy a copyrighted work before the 
alleged infringement took place.”58  Courts generally require a 
showing of access in order to establish a prima facie case of 
infringement.59  In determining whether or not access exists, the 
court looks to whether or not the alleged infringer “had a 
reasonable opportunity to view the copyrighted work.”60  A 
plaintiff can meet the burden of showing reasonable opportunity by 
producing evidence that the original work had been widely 
disseminated, or that the defendant had been exposed to the work 
through a chain of events.61 
The issue of access can be overcome by showing that the 
similarities between the original and infringing work are 
substantial to the point that exceeds coincidence.62  There have 
been cases where the proof of access was weak but the court found 
the similarities warranted a finding of infringement.63  There have 
also been cases where the court found that, despite lack of 
evidence of access, the defendant was guilty of infringement 
because the songs were so similar that they would be identical to 
the ear of the “ordinary listener.”64  Finally, there have been 
situations where the court has held the defendant guilty of 
subconscious infringement.  In the aforementioned case, the court 
 
 57 See Ferguson v. Nat’l Broad. Co., Inc., 584 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 58 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 14 (8th ed. 2004). 
 59 See AM. JUR. 2d, Copyright and Literary Property § 206 (1985); Arnstein v. Porter, 
154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 60 Kravis, supra note 25, at 245. 
 61 See Lassin v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43862, at *15–16 
(S.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2005). 
 62 See generally Aaron Keyt, An Improved Framework for Music Plagiarism Litigation, 
76 CAL. L. REV. 429 (1988) (discussing the changing concept of access in light of 
unconscious copyright infringement). 
 63 See id. at 429. 
 64 See Dorchester Music Corp. v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 171 F. Supp. 580, 586–87 (S.D. 
Cal. 1959). 
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concluded that George Harrison had infringed upon the Chiffon’s 
copyrighted material without even realizing he had done so.65 
The test courts use in examining the similarities between two 
works does not necessarily examine the quantitative amount of the 
original work that has been copied.  Rather, the court finds that 
there is a compelling interest in the significance of the copied 
portion to the original work as a whole.66  A new work fails the 
substantial similarity test when a reasonable listener fails to see or 
hear how the new work incorporated something that does not exist 
in the original.67  In order to constitute substantial similarity, “the 
‘total concept’ and ‘feel’ of the two works must be similar.”68  In 
line with the substantial similarity test, courts have also adopted 
the de minimis doctrine, which applies in cases where the aspect of 
the work that is the subject of the alleged infringement is so 
miniscule that the law will not consider it.69 
II. “WHY’D YA HAVE TO GO AND MAKE THINGS SO 
COMPLICATED?”:70 THE CLASH BETWEEN THE  
INTERNET AND MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 
A. Music as a Distinctive Genre of Copyright 
Music is a unique genre in the field of copyright protection.  It 
is a special category deserving of independent copyright 
consideration.  “The inherent nature of music makes it difficult to 
detect copyright violations.”71  Each musical composition and 
sound recording is composed of multiple elements working 
together.  New technology and the digital world have created new 
and improved means for manipulating those elements in an 
 
 65 Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that copyright infringement exists under the law even if it is 
accomplished subconsciously). 
 66 See Courtney Bartlett, Bridgeport Music’s Two-Second Sample Rule Puts the Chill 
on the Music Industry, 15 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 301, 311 (2005). 
 67 See Kravis, supra note 25, at 245–46. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Bartlett, supra note 66, at 312. 
 70 AVRIL LAVIGNE, Complicated, on LET GO (Arista Records 2002). 
 71 Christian, supra note 33, at 133. 
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original work and incorporating them into a new work.72  The 
traditional lens for examining musical copyright is outdated 
because it fails to consider the complexity of a contemporary 
musical work.73 
In some situations, it is difficult to reconcile a finding of actual 
infringement in light of the inevitable similarities that exist among 
musical works.74  Musicians work with a finite set of notes and 
octaves in creating a composition.  Further, the combination of 
these notes into sets of chords that are pleasing to the ear is also 
limited.75  Despite the seemingly confined raw materials for 
creating a musical work, musicians are able to manipulate these 
finite elements into infinite possible compositions.  In examining 
originality, copyright does not look to the actual notes or chords 
used, but rather combinations of notes and chords that are used to 
create tone, melody, harmony, and rhythm.76 
Traditionally, it is believed that originality in a musical work 
lies in either the rhythm, melody, or harmony of the piece.77  This 
notion of originality fails to account for the multitude of 
components that make up a musical work.  Consequently, the 
frame of reference for musical copyright infringement is outdated 
because it fails to consider all of the possible aspects for originality 
in a musical work.78  Additional technical elements that should be 
examined in determining the originality of a work are “patterns of 
notes, using a particular phrase as melody or accompaniment, the 
 
 72 See id. at 142. 
 73 See Alan Korn, Issues Facing Legal Practitioners in Measuring Substantiality of 
Contemporary Musical Expression, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 489, 490–91 
(2007). 
 74 See Christian, supra note 33, at 133 (“These similarities demonstrate the need for a 
systematic method of distinguishing the acceptable similarities from the offensive 
takings.”). 
 75 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 653 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(stating the fact that there are a limited amount of notes and chords available to 
composers). 
 76 See Ronald Smith, Arrangements and Editions of Public Domain Music: Originality 
in a Finite System, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 104, 104 (1983) (“Copyright law seeks to 
determine whether a certain combination of tones is ‘original’ within this finite system.”). 
 77 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 78 See Korn, supra note 73, at 490–91 (proposing that the lens for examining musical 
copyright is too limited in its consideration of what can make a musical work original). 
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chord structure of the piece, [and] the lyrics used in specific parts 
of the work.”79 
Music is also a special genre of copyright with regard to the 
idea-expression dichotomy.  The idea-expression dichotomy holds 
that only elements of original expression, separate from the basic 
ideas underlying the expression, are entitled to copyright 
protection.80  The elements of musical works are not easily 
separated into those constituting original expression and those that 
are part of the basic, mechanical ideas.81  An artist’s musical 
expression is inextricably linked to the mechanics of the music.  
The sequencing of notes and chords, the harmony, melody, beat, 
tempo, composition, and lyrics all work together to create a 
musical expression.82  Individually, each of these components, 
except for the lyrics, constitutes an unoriginal, un-copyrightable 
idea.  Collectively, certain lyrics set to certain notes and chords, 
played in a certain way creates an expression.  It’s an expression 
that becomes an experience to the person who listens to and 
engages with it.83  Removing the individual ideas would destroy 
the musical work as a whole.  Simply put, “[i]n music, there is no 
‘idea’ or ‘expression’ to be distinguished . . . it is an impossible 
distinction to make.”84 
B. Changing Technology and Copyright 
Conflicts concerning copyright infringement, especially those 
arising out of musical works, are at the forefront of current 
discussions regarding the role of the Internet and advanced 
technology and the rights of copyright holders.85  The advent of 
new technology and subsequent tension with copyright laws 
unequipped to respond is not a novel concern for the courts.  When 
 
 79 Christian, supra note 33, at 135. 
 80 See supra text accompanying notes 36–39. 
 81 See Keyt, supra note 62, at 421–22 (explaining why music as a medium does not 
lend itself to the idea-expression dichotomy). 
 82 See Smith, supra note 76, at 118. 
 83 See J. Michael Keyes, Musical Musings: The Case for Rethinking Music Copyright 
Protection, 10 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 407, 421, 424 (stating that music has 
“ethereal qualities” that affect and impact its listeners’ lives and experiences). 
 84 Keyt, supra note 62, at 442–43. 
 85 See Keyes, supra note 83, at 408–09. 
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Sony introduced the Beta Max, and its capabilities to tape one 
television program while the viewer was either not home or 
occupied with another program, the court was forced to decide 
whether or not these capabilities constituted infringement.86  The 
Court held that the Beta Max’s ability to shift time did not 
constitute infringement, and order was restored to the land of 
copyright litigation.87 
More recently, the practice of music sampling has consumed 
conversation and litigation regarding musical copyright 
infringement.  Although music sampling is not a novel practice, it 
has become a more prevalent custom in all musical genres.88  
Sampling allows one musician to directly lift some part of another 
artist’s work and incorporate it into the musician’s new work.89  
Courts have been divided on how to handle the issue of sampling 
and whether or not it constitutes infringement.  This has resulted in 
a number of inconsistent decisions that introduced competing 
concepts over how much sampling was too much or too little to 
constitute infringement.90  The Sixth Circuit in Bridgeport Music, 
Inc. v. Dimension Films made a controversial decision91 holding 
that all sampling, whether it consisted of three notes or a full 
minute of an original work, constitutes infringement.92 
 
 86 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 
(1984). 
 87 See id. 
 88 See Jeffrey F. Kersting, Singing a Different Tune: Was the Sixth Circuit Justified in 
Changing the Protection of Sound Recordings In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension 
Films?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 663, 665–67 (2005) (discussing the history of sampling). 
 89 Sampling (Music), Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sampling_%28music 
%29 (last visited Feb. 19, 2008). 
 90 Different courts have approached the issue of determining what amount of sampling 
constitutes infringement in various ways. Compare, e.g., Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. 
Supp. 2d 1244, 1259 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (holding that a sampled three-note sequence was 
too small to constitute infringement), with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 
401 F.3d 647, 656–68 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that all sampling, even three notes, 
constitutes infringement). 
 91 See generally Bartlett, supra note 66, at 320–21 (criticizing the Bridgeport court); 
see also M. Leah Somoano, Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films: Has Unlicensed 
Sampling of Copyrighted Sound Recordings Come to an End?, 21 BERKELY TECH. L.J. 
289 (2006); Kersting, supra note 88. 
 92 Bridgeport, 401 F.3d at 656–68. 
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At times, Congress has responded to issues facing the court by 
passing new legislation that attempts to regulate the Internet and 
infringement.93  In the 1990s, it was widely recognized that the 
copyright laws were inadequate in light of the changes in 
communication and availability of information made possible by 
the Internet and digital technology.94  Limited to the provisions of 
the Copyright Act of 1976, the copyright laws were outdated and 
could not properly accommodate the consequences of such 
advancements.95  Copyright holders, especially those holding 
rights to musical works, were scrambling to protect their work and 
found that they were somewhat powerless against the popularity of 
the World Wide Web.96  Legislators and judiciaries were, and still 
are, forced to reexamine how best to protect musical works.97 
In 1998, Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (“DMCA”), which criminalized online or digital attempts to 
circumvent measures to protect copyrighted material from 
infringement.98  Section 512, a provision of the DMCA, governs 
limitations on liability for Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) 
relating to infringement of online material on websites they host.99  
Subsection (c) provides a safe harbor for ISPs, relieving them of 
liability for infringing activity if the ISP did not have control over 
the infringing content, expeditiously removed the infringing 
material, and did not directly benefit financially from the 
material.100  ISPs that fail to meet all three requirements of the safe 
 
 93 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) 
(“[A]s new developments have occurred in this country, it has been Congress that has 
fashioned new rules that technology made necessary.”). 
 94 See Brian Sanchez, Legislative Update: The Section 115 Mechanical License and the 
Copyright Modernization Act, 17 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 37, 42–43 
(2006). 
 95 See Korn, supra note 73, at 490. 
 96 Copyrighted musical works were, and still are, made easily and readily available free 
of charge on countless Internet sites. See Keyes, supra note 83, at 418 (“The Internet has 
made procurement of all types of music incredibly easy, and monstrously cost effective, 
which has lured users to this new medium in unparalleled droves.”). 
 97 See id. at 419–20 (“The basic and essentially exclusive philosophical inquiry posed 
by music copyright legislators and judicial decision makers has been this: are music 
copyright owners being adequately protected from others’ use of the musical material?”). 
 98 See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). 
 99 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
 100 Id. § 512(c). 
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harbor provision are held responsible for the dissemination of, or 
access to, the infringing material hosted on their websites.101 
In addition to digitalized technology concerns that are at the 
forefront of the current debate surrounding how to regulate Internet 
copyright, traditional means of infringement are still a prevalent 
concern for musical copyright holders.102  The magnitude of 
copyright infringement claims is not fully realized in popular 
culture since most claims are settled prior to actual litigation.103  
Cases that have actually proceeded to litigation highlight that 
musical copyright infringement, whether through traditional or 
digitized means, has been, and continues to be, a compelling 
concern for the judiciary, yielding a variety of results.104  In 
McDonald v. Multimedia Entertainment, Inc., the Southern District 
of New York held that the use of one “rather unimportant” note by 
the defendant could not support a finding of infringement in light 
of the dissimilar nature of the rest of the two compositions.105  In 
Cottrill v. Spears, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that 
although defendant, Brittney Spears’ song entitled What U See is 
What U Get, was obviously similar to the plaintiff’s song, What 
You See is What You Get, this similarity in title, which was also 
reflected in both songs’ lyrics, “[was] not probative of copying as 
the phrase is a cliché and can be found in prior art.”106  The court 
also found that the similarities in the two songs’ pitch, chords, 
tempo, and repetition of a single note in each verse was insufficient 
to warrant a finding of infringement.107 
Not all copyright litigation has resulted in findings favoring the 
defendant.  The court in Baxter v. MCA, Inc. held that there could 
 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Keyes, supra note 83, at 418 (“From 1950 through 2000, there were forty-three 
reported cases dealing with music copyright infringement . . . .”). 
 103 See id. (stating the fact that many more disputes centered on music copyright 
infringement never ripened into litigation). 
 104 See Christian, supra note 33, at 134–40 (discussing musical copyright infringement 
cases). 
 105 McDonald v. Multimedia Entm’t, Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10649, at *7 
(S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1991). 
 106 Cottrill v. Spears, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8823, at *33 (E.D. Pa. May 22, 2003). 
 107 See id. (holding that these similarities are common aspects of popular music and 
constitute insufficient similarity). 
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possibly be a finding of infringement even when the similarity 
between two works could be reduced to a short, six note 
sequence.108  The case of Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham involved 
two songs that were popular at different times.  The alleged 
infringement consisted of an eight note pattern that created the 
same effect in both pieces.109  The court held that the defendant 
was liable for infringement, even though the act was done 
subconsciously by the defendant.110  Finally, in Jarvis v. A&M 
Records, the court held that although common phrase and chord 
progressions are usually non-copyrightable, the phrasing in the 
original work was a copyrightable expression.111 
The end of the twentieth and advent of the twenty-first 
centuries have been marked by technological advancement and an 
increasing presence of the Internet in everyday life.  The changes 
brought by the Internet create unprecedented issues of copyright 
infringement that the courts are unsure what to do with, 
particularly with regard to musical works.112  The court in 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films acknowledged and 
addressed the reality that technological advances have created a 
new set of infringement possibilities and copyright disputes.113  
Currently, there are no absolute, clear cut answers or guidelines to 
regulate infringing activity on the Internet.114 
 
 108 Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 425 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 109 Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1924). 
 110 Id. at 148. 
 111 Jarvis v. A&M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 292 (D.N.J. 1993). 
 112 Keyes, supra note 83, at 408–09 (“With the demise of Napster, the rise of peer-to-
peer networking, and the onslaught of litigation orchestrated by the RIAA, the topic of 
music copyright has been thrust to the fore in business, scholarly and policy-making 
circles. . . . Policy makers are grasping for the ever-evasive answers as to how the law 
should be deployed and applied in the world of networked file-swapping, particularly in 
the context of music copyrights.”). 
 113 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 401 F.3d 647, 655 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 114 See generally Symposium, The Death or Rebirth of the Copyright, 18 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1095 (2008); see also Christian, supra note 33, at 142 
(“The music industry is in grave need of a standard by which to judge the many uses of 
fragmented copying.”). 
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III. “I’D RATHER BE ANYTHING BUT ORDINARY PLEASE”:115  
PUMPING ORIGINALITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY  
INTO THE MUSICAL COPYRIGHT SCHEMA 
A. Reworking the Originality Requirement 
In the midst of a culture marked by copycat artists and 
technological advancements that encourage infringing activity, one 
may wonder what, if anything, can be done to bring original and 
creative music back from the dead.  One possibility is to rework 
the existing originality requirement for musical copyright.  By 
raising the standard for originality, the access of the entire music 
catalogue made possible by the Internet could be used to prevent 
potential infringement disputes. 
In the current copyright regime for musical works, there is no 
definition of originality.116  A work sufficiently meets the criteria 
for originality as long as it was independently created with a 
modicum of creativity.117  The existing concept of originality is 
concerned only with the creative process and not the product.  This 
is in direct opposition to the novelty standard required in patent 
law.118  Novelty replaces originality in patent law.119  In order to 
qualify for patent protection, a work must be novel, not just to the 
author but to the public at large.  To receive patent protection “you 
must do something new.”120  While patent novelty goes a bit too 
far for musical copyright, the current minimal standard of 
originality does not require enough from the artist.  A hybrid of 
copyright originality and patent novelty would best serve the 
interests of promoting the creation of new works without stifling 
the creative process in music.  The hybrid would be simultaneously 
concerned with an independent creative process and would 
examine the product resulting from the process in light of the 
entire catalogue of already existing musical copyrights.  To ensure 
that the revised requirement does not go beyond what is necessary 
 
 115 AVRIL LAVIGNE, Anything But Ordinary, on LET GO (Arista Records 2002). 
 116 See supra text accompanying notes 41–47. 
 117 MERGES ET AL., supra note 44. 
 118 See id. 
 119 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). 
 120 ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY 161 (1992). 
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to provide the public with new and creative works, determining 
qualification for copyright protection would place more emphasis 
on the creative process than the resulting product. 
Since musical works are made up of various technical 
elements, there is more than ample room in musical works for a 
higher standard of originality.121  The originality requirement for 
musical copyright should be used to further the framers’ intention 
of promoting creative works.  Copyright laws should utilize 
originality as a tool to increase creativity among musical artists to 
ensure that they are in fact striving to produce something that is 
somewhat new.  Requiring more than a modicum of creativity is 
the first step in forcing artists to realize the untapped potential for 
originality in musical works.  Perhaps if Avril Lavigne, Vanilla 
Ice, Michael Bolton, and countless other artists had previously 
been held to a higher standard of originality, copycat works and 
costly lawsuits could have been avoided, and truly original musical 
works could have come to fruition instead. 
B. Using the Internet as a Shield Against Potential  
Infringement Claims 
Supporters of the current originality requirement in copyright 
are concerned that raising the bar would place too great a burden 
on artists and would, in effect, stifle the creative process.122  These 
supporters are ignoring the possibility that a stronger originality 
requirement that would encourage accountability in the product 
does not have to affect the creative process.123  Under the revised 
originality requirement, the creative process of an artist would 
remain unchanged.  No additional steps are required until the 
creative process has ended and resulted in a musical piece.  
Further, that creative process, if independent and original to the 
artist, would be an important consideration in determining the 
original value of the musical work.  Once the creative process is 
complete, and the musical work is in its final form, the artist would 
 
 121 See Smith, supra note 76, at 142. 
 122 See Keyes, supra note 83, at 425 (claiming that copyright holders are given too broad 
a power over their works). 
 123 Contra Bartlett, supra note 66, at 320 (arguing that requiring an artist to stop and 
obtain a license when wanting to sample is disruptive to the creative process). 
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have to examine that final product against the existing catalogue of 
copyrighted musical works. 
Under the current test for copyright, an original artist must 
show that the alleged infringer had access to the original work.124  
The law as written encourages willful blindness.  As long as an 
artist doesn’t look, he may not be held responsible for what should 
be infringement.  The message being sent is: if it can’t be proven 
that I have heard the original work, then I have not infringed.  On 
the other end of the spectrum, the law as written allows artists to be 
punished for subconscious copyright infringement.125  In these 
situations, artists who unknowingly infringe upon an original work 
are held responsible for the infringement based solely on the 
“striking similarities” between the two works.  The unsuspecting 
artist is dragged into a settlement or litigation and is forced to 
compensate the original artist for his subconscious violation.  In 
both situations, either the willfully blind artist or the subconscious 
infringing artist is forced to partake in some legal proceeding, 
whether it is a settlement or litigation, to resolve the conflict. 
The Internet has more or less defeated a defense to the access 
argument.  Whether or not an infringing artist has actually had 
access is somewhat irrelevant in a society where anyone easily 
could have access in a matter of seconds.126  The increased level of 
access made possible by the Internet could be used to force artists 
to be initially accountable for any possible infringement before 
receiving a copyright for the “new” work.  In order to receive a 
copyright, an artist would have to search a database to see if the 
work he is claiming as his own has already been published by 
someone else.  The database could be created by members of the 
music industry who would maintain and update the database, as 
well as deal with potential infringements that artists are made 
aware of through it. 
 
 124 See supra text accompanying notes 58–65. 
 125 See Keyes, supra note 83, at 425 (arguing that the copyright laws are wrong to 
punish subconscious infringement). 
 126 See id. at 418 (“[T]he Internet has made procurement of all types of music incredibly 
easy and monstrously cost effective . . . .”); see also Keyt, supra note 62, at 429 (stating 
that copying is proved by the defendant’s ability to access the plaintiff’s work and the 
similarity between their works). 
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This database would allow an artist to search through the 
catalogue of copyrighted musical works by using segments of the 
new work.  The artist could simultaneously search all of the 
technical elements, as well as the lyrics, working together to see if 
his creation mirrors one that already exists.  The artist would be 
able to see if his chord sequence set to a certain tempo or rhythm, 
against a specific melody or harmony, and set to certain lyrics is 
already in the copyright catalogue.  If there was a potential match, 
the artist would not be declined a copyright for his “new” work.  
He would, however, have to seek the appropriate permission from 
the original artist, through the regulators of the database, before 
being granted a copyright. 
The process of seeking permission would involve some form of 
compulsory licensing as well as a sliding scale of compensation for 
the original author based on the amount and similarity of the 
potential infringement.127  Upon learning of a potential 
infringement, an artist seeking copyright would contact a copyright 
regulatory board, associated with the database, and explain the 
nature of the similarities, or submit samples of the similar sound 
clips.  The board would then decide the merits of the potential 
infringement claim and calculate the appropriate compensation to 
the original artist based on the amount, substantiality, similarity, 
and originality of the infringed segment.128  If similarity was found 
between the two works in a way that an ordinary listener would 
determine the segments were similar but could still hear a slight 
difference, appropriate compensation might simply be an 
acknowledgment to the original artist in the new album.129  The 
more similar two segments are, and the increasing length of similar 
 
 127 Other articles have suggested similar licensing schemes with regard to conflicts in 
musical copyright. See Kravis, supra note 25, at 273–75 (suggesting a modified 
compulsory licensing scheme to regulate the practice of music sampling); R. Anthony 
Reese, Copyright and Internet Music Transmissions: Existing Law, Major Controversies, 
Possible Solutions, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 265–66 (2001) (suggesting a new collective 
licensing mechanism in which “[l]icenses could be tailored and priced depending on the 
nature of the transmission”). 
 128 See generally Keyes, supra note 83, at 439 (encouraging a system that allows use of 
pre-existing work by new artists based on a fee that considers the amount of music 
borrowed and the number of phonorecords produced). 
 129 See generally Smith, supra note 76, at 138–39 (suggesting a sliding scale approach 
to determine the extent of a work’s originality). 
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segments would increase compensation from acknowledgment to a 
monetary royalty that would be appropriate to reflect the original 
artist’s interests. 
New artists who conduct a good faith search under this scheme 
would be granted a compulsory license to the “borrowed” segment 
from the original work, as an incentive for new artists to comply 
with the provision.  In exchange for the determined appropriate 
compensation, the original artist would be forced to allow the new 
artist to “borrow” the segment from the original work under a 
compulsory license.  A compulsory license allows an artist to use 
the copyrighted work of another artist without explicit permission 
in exchange for a royalty payment.130  Compulsory licensing is 
provided for in the Copyright Act with regard to musical works.131  
An artist seeking use of an existing copyrighted work is entitled to 
a compulsory license if he notifies the original author of his intent, 
or if the original author cannot be found, by filing notice in the 
Copyright Office.132  The compulsory licensee may not change the 
basic, fundamental character of the work.133  The concept of 
extending compulsory licensing in musical copyright has been a 
recent topic of debate with regard to digital sampling.134  Those in 
favor of extending compulsory licensing find that its ability to 
guarantee access to the existing catalogue of copyrighted works 
will ensure that original artists are appropriately compensated for 
use of their works.135  Other scholars argue that extending 
compulsory licensing would be unfair to original authors, because 
compulsory licensing forces the original artist to allow the new 
artist to use the work.  They also argue that extending compulsory 
licensing would compromise the integrity of the original musical 
work, because the original artist is powerless to object to changes 
and manipulations of the original work by the new artist, so long as 
 
 130 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 938 (8th ed. 2004). 
 131 See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Digital sampling is the process by which an artist copies part of another artist’s work 
and incorporates the original work verbatim into the new work. See BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 1368 (8th ed. 2004). 
 135 Kravis, supra note 25, at 274–75. 
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the new artist does not fundamentally change the character of the 
work.136 
An extension of compulsory licensing in the proposed scheme 
for encouraging originality would serve to protect authors whose 
works are incidentally similar to those of new artists and would 
preempt unnecessary legal proceedings that result in the case of 
dubiously similar songs.  For example, take the case of Avril 
Lavigne’s current copyright controversy.  Under the proposed 
system, Avril would have been made aware of the similar sounding 
Rubinoos’ song prior to releasing Girlfriend.  She then could have 
contacted the regulatory board to determine her next step.  
Depending on the board’s analysis, the Rubinoos would have been 
properly notified and compensated.  The pending litigation and 
possible settlement would not have started, saving Avril, and the 
Rubinoos, lawyer fees, court costs, and time. 
This process would preempt the potential litigation or 
settlement proceedings that willfully blind or subconscious 
infringers face.  An artist would have already conducted a good 
faith search for potential infringement.  In many cases, this would 
circumvent the need for potential litigation by dealing with the 
problem before it becomes a problem.  In the long run, artists 
would be saving money spent on lawyer’s fees, expert witness 
testimony that is necessary in every copyright infringement case, 
and potential jury awards that would exceed the royalties allotted 
for on the sliding scale.137  The artist would also avoid the 
embarrassment of any bad press that comes with allegations of 
infringement in the aftermath of releasing a popular work.  The 
court would also benefit as this system would “help stem the 
swelling tide of music copyright infringement cases.”138  Most 
artists would prefer to conduct a search and face the possibility of 
 
 136 Lucille M. Ponte, The Emperor Has No Clothes: How Digital Sampling Infringement 
Cases Are Exposing Weaknesses in Traditional Copyright Law and the Need for 
Statutory Reform, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 515, 551 (2006). 
 137 See Christian, supra note 33, at 135. 
 138 Keyes, supra note 83, at 439–40 (discussing the positive ramifications of this 
proposed compulsory license scheme on overcrowded court dockets and the increasing 
number of copyright infringement cases). 
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potentially paying the appropriate compulsory fee rather than 
“facing a potential lengthy and costly court battle.” 139 
C. Old and New Protection for Musical Artists 
The traditional safeguards present in existing musical copyright 
law ensure that musical works would not be disadvantaged by a 
heightened standard of originality or the proposed process 
advocating accountability.  Section 115 entitles any artist to a 
compulsory license in an endeavor to remake or “cover” an 
original work.140  A compulsory license is in use as soon as the 
new artist distributes copies in a fixed tangible form to the public 
under the authority of the original artist.141  In order to be entitled 
to a compulsory license, notice must be given to the copyright 
holder of the licensee’s intent.142  Without this notice, a 
compulsory license will not be granted and the would-be licensee 
is liable for infringement.143  The proposal in the previous section 
incorporates notice into the process through the suggested 
copyright regulatory board. 
An important aspect of the compulsory license is that it allows 
the licensee to create his own sound recording of the original work, 
but it does not permit the licensee to copy the original recording.144  
This aspect of compulsory licensing is important to the purpose of 
the copyright schema previously proposed.  It signifies that the 
licensee must put his own labor into creating the recording that 
triggers use of the license.145  The licensee cannot merely lift or 
copy the original recording.  The compulsory license provision 
gives new artists an overwhelming opportunity to use the existing 
catalogue.  It also serves as a control on the exclusive rights and 
monopoly of a copyright holder.146 
 
 139 Id. 
 140 See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000). 
 141 See Sanchez, supra note 94, at 39–42 (explaining compulsory licensing). 
 142 See 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
 143 See Sanchez, supra note 94, at 39–42 (explaining compulsory licensing). 
 144 See id. 
 145 See 17 U.S.C. § 115. 
 146 See Palladium Music, Inc. v. Eatsleepmusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1198–1200 (10th 
Cir. 2005). 
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The proposed scheme does not defeat the traditional copyright 
defenses of fair use and de minimis use.  Section 107 carves an 
exception in the exclusive rights of a copyright holder for “fair 
use” by others.147  In determining whether or not a new work 
constitutes a fair use of an original work, the factors considered 
are: (1) the purpose and nature of the new work; (2) the nature of 
the copyrighted work; (3) the amount of the original work used and 
the substantiality of the used portion to the original work as a 
whole; and (4) the effect of the new work on the original’s 
potential in the marketplace.148  The proposed standard for musical 
copyright in no way affects, changes, or limits the fair use defense.  
The de minimis doctrine provides that if the alleged infringement 
is essentially trivial, the court will not recognize it.149  The sliding 
scale in the proposed process does not swallow the de minimis 
defense; instead, it incorporates it.  After a potential infringement 
is brought to the copyright regulatory board, the board would 
analyze the situation to determine if an infringement worthy of 
recognition or compensation exists.  It logically follows that if an 
artist reports a potential infringement that fits the de minimis 
standard, the board would conclude that the potential infringement 
is not worthy of recognition. 
In addition to the existing protection afforded to new artists and 
copyright holders, the proposed originality and accountability 
standards offer new protection.  In order to prevail on a claim of 
copyright infringement, the new procedure looks for originality in 
the work as a whole.  It examines all of the components of a 
musical piece working together to determine whether or not it is 
similar enough to an already copyrighted work to constitute 
infringement.  This concept realizes that originality lies within the 
work as a whole and not in a single, removed technical element.150  
Consequently, copyright infringement would be based and only 
 
 147 See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 148 See id.; see generally Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1993). 
 149 See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 435 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[A] taking is 
considered de minimis only if it is so meager and fragmentary that the average audience 
would not recognize the appropriation.”). 
 150 See Keyt, supra note 62, at 433 (“[O]riginality is more likely to be found in the 
interaction and conjunction of elements than in the elements themselves . . . .”). 
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exist in similarities resulting from all of the elements of a piece 
working together as a single expression. 
CONCLUSION: 
The question remains: will life be pumped back into the 
originality requirement for musical copyright or will the practices 
of copycats reign supreme?  Since musical works are composed of 
a combination of elements working together, artists should be 
pushed to reach a little bit higher than authors of other copyrighted 
material in terms of creating original works.  Originality in the 
creation of musical works does not have to be a dead or defeated 
concept.  There is plenty of room for original thought and 
creativity in the musical world; however, the potential for it may 
never be realized if artists are not forced to think outside of the 
already constructed box. 
The proposed resolution, discussed in the previous section, 
adds a concern for the product resulting from the creative process 
where the current concept for musical copyright is only concerned 
with the process itself.  It heightens the requirement for a musical 
work to qualify as an “original work of authorship.”  To continue 
balancing the competing interests of protecting the work of a 
copyright holder and not stifling the creative process, the second 
part of the resolution proposes using the availability of the musical 
catalogue on the Internet as a means of promoting accountability 
among artists after the completion of the creative process, but prior 
to distributing their work to the public.  The sliding scale approach 
would allow the original artist to be acknowledged or compensated 
appropriately and would preempt potential litigation or 
infringement claims in the aftermath of the new artist promoting 
their new work. 
Today’s alleged infringers are tomorrow’s artists who will be 
fighting for their rights as copyright holders to original works.  It’s 
a well known fact in the music world that musicians get their 
inspiration and motivation from listening to other musicians.151  
 
 151 See Christian, supra note 33, at 142 (stating the belief that musicians are inspired by 
other musicians). 
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Doesn’t the inspiring musician deserve credit or acknowledgment 
if his original work is the base of what another artist creates?  
Contemporary artists, who will eventually become inspiring 
musicians, would benefit from the protection their works would 
receive in the future under the proposed copyright scheme.  
Reworking the copyright regime for musical works could be the 
first step in a new direction that considers using the Internet to 
ameliorate, instead of only contribute to, copyright infringement.  
If the laws remain unchanged, we’re going to be stuck with the 
same old song—and maybe it’s time for something new. 
 
